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N

eady to restart her life with hope for recovery from her addiction to prescription opiates,
a young woman spent her first day in her new town renting an apartment, attending a church
service, walking on the beach, and making her initial visit to the local methadone clinic. Two
days later she was dead of an overdose. The first day’s standard clinic dose was increased on
the second and third days without physician oversight, without any review of information
from the drug test that was mandated on admission, and without confirmation from the state
methadone registry that she was not enrolled elsewhere. With benzodiazepines still in her
system, the addition of methadone suppressed her breathing. She had no counseling, and
following a cursory physician visit on day one, saw no one on the second and third days other
than an LPN, who observed her as she drank the methadone from a plastic cup. The clinic,
which at that time was operating with a medical director without a medical license, did not
report her death, suffered no negative ramifications or penalties imposed by state or federal
regulators, and continues to be accredited by a private accrediting agency. In the two years
since her death, it has been business as usual at the for-profit storefront opioid treatment
center, where clients line up before daylight with cash in hand to receive the substances that
reduce their cravings.
Over 300,000 people in the United States are dependent on the services of
methadone clinics, more properly known as opioid treatment programs (OTPs). OTPs provide
regular doses of methadone and other substitutes that enable most clients to continue to
function in society despite their addictions. Regulation of OTPs is multi-layered and complex
with uneven standards and enforcement across the country. OTPs are certified by the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which, since 2001,
has required accreditation from a SAMHSA-approved accreditation body, (42 CFR Part 8) as
well as compliance with SAMHSA standards. While SAMHSA determines rules concerning
how opioid substitutes used for treatment may be distributed to OTP clients, the Food and
Drug Administration is responsible for the manufacturing and labeling of methadone and
specifies which drugs may be used in the course of treatment of addiction to heroin and,
increasingly, as prescription abuse has grown, other opioid pain relievers. The Drug
Enforcement Administration monitors methadone and other opioid treatment supplies
through site visits and oversees the possible diversion of these controlled substances
(Committee on Federal Regulation of Medicine, Institute of Medicine 1995, 2) for illicit
purposes, including resale.
Less well understood are the role and effect of state regulation in the oversight of
OTPs. Previous studies of state regulation of outpatient substance abuse programs have
sometimes omitted OTPs because they are largely considered to be creatures of the federal
certification process. This omission occurs despite the fact that state policies on substance
abuse “may have significant public health implications” (Chriqui, Terry-McElrath, and
McBride 2008, 18). In their description of the history of regulation of opioid agonist treatment
in the United States, Jaffe and O’Keeffe describe the frustration of OTP clinicians with federal
regulation considered by some to be “burdensome interference with the practice of medicine”
(2003, 85), but they also point out that the matter is more complicated than just federal
control:
Although some of the criticism is valid, it often fails to distinguish between
federal, state, and local regulatory burdens. State and local jurisdictions
have also seen fit to enact legislation governing these programs, and some
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of those regulatory requirements are far more restrictive than federal ones.
For example, some localities do not permit any take-home medication
(Jaffe and O’Keeffe 2003, 85).
Even at the state level, multiple entities have a hand in regulation of OTPs.
Licensure requirements for clinics in addition to SAMHSA mandates vary across the states.
Compliance with regulations may be handled by the Opioid Treatment Authority, the state’s
mental health or substance abuse agency, or the licensing body. Prescription monitoring
programs interact with OTPs in some states, which may also involve the state pharmacy
board, while OTP physicians are licensed and disciplined by state medical boards. Clinic staff
– nurses, social workers, and counselors – generally have their own licensing authorities. Data
on reportable deaths related to OTPs may be maintained by the state’s criminal investigation
bureau or by the medical examiner or multiple medical examiners in separate locations, but
not at the state’s opioid treatment or licensing authority. In states that provide higher levels
of Medicaid funding for methadone treatment, another layer of oversight is added. In addition,
some local governments have instituted ordinances that limit the placement of methadone
facilities or provide additional oversight related to public health (Committee on Federal
Regulation of Medicine, Institute of Medicine 1995; Wallace 2011).
Fragmented Oversight Creates ‘Regulatory Fog’
The complexities inherent in such fragmented oversight may lead to a condition that
has been described by Warren and Wilkening as “regulatory fog, the phenomenon by which
regulation obscures information regarding the value of counterfactual policies” (2012, 840).
While these economist-authors focus on the persistence of regulation due to an inability to
compare the need for regulation to an unregulated scenario, we borrow the term to describe
the scenario in which many overlapping policies result in a fog in which regulation becomes
separated from outcomes that the regulations were initially intended to control. In some
circumstances, the regulation itself becomes the measuring stick rather than the
appropriateness of the policies or even the outcomes associated with the OTPs. Jaffe and
O’Keefe point out that criticisms of the current OTP regulatory process arise due to the fact
that “regulatory oversight is concerned exclusively with process, although actual treatment
outcome can be measured” (2003, 85). The purpose of this study is two-fold: to compare OTP
regulations across the states to determine if stringency of regulation affects the number and
type of clinics and patients and to determine if the “regulatory fog” created by the
complexities of multi-agency governmental regulation obscures outcomes, as borrowed from
the theory of Warren and Wilkening.
From Heroin to Prescription Opioids: The Changing Face of Addiction
Methadone as a medical treatment first gained acceptance in the United States in the
late 1960s, thanks in large part to the work of researchers Marie Nyswander and Vincent Dole
(Kleber 2008, 2303), who, in response to an epidemic of heroin use in the U.S., recommended
the use of methadone as a long-term harm reduction strategy (Dole and Nyswander 1965).
Prior to this research, U.S. policy – confirmed in a 1919 Supreme Court decision – prevented
physicians from treating addictions with opioids (Center for Substance Abuse Treatment
2008, 8). The Dole-Nyswander work has been described as shifting addiction from its status
as a social problem to a medical problem, in effect from “badness” to “sickness” (Rosenbaum
1995, 145). Since that time, however, methadone maintenance has been “demedicalized”
(Rosenbaum 1995, 145). Though OTP practices vary from town to town and state to state,
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methadone is often dispensed from strip mall clinics by nurses, with little physician oversight
and out of the context of more mainstream health care services.
Berridge points out that while addiction treatment decisions have often been evidencebased, they have been, in part, political (2009). Though Kleber writes that “the benefits of
long-term methadone maintenance are borne out by data” (2008, 2304), methadone
maintenance is still controversial and underfunded. The maintenance approach, as
differentiated from detoxification or abstinence, “has always struggled for acceptance against
the forces of public opinion and politics” (Kuehn 2005, 887).
What began in the U.S. as a heroin problem has shifted dramatically to inappropriate
use of prescription opiates. According to the National Drug Survey, in 2011, 620,000 or 2
percent of U.S. citizens ages 12 and older had used heroin in the past year compared to
11,143,000 or 4.3 percent who had nonmedical use of pain relievers (SAMHSA 2012b).
About three times as many National Survey on Drug Use and Health respondents used
Oxycontin® in 2011 than had used heroin (SAMHSA 2012b). Physician Susanna Duncan puts
opioid use in layman’s terms:
Enough of these opiate-based drugs were prescribed last year to medicate
every American adult with a dose of five mg of hydrocodone . . . taken
every four hours, for a month, and have led to over 40,000 drug overdose
deaths. Today there are more overdose deaths from opioid analgesics than
heroin and cocaine combined (2012).
Methadone is responsible for about a third of opiate-related deaths, deaths ascribed to
methadone 5.5 times as high in 2009 as in 1999 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2012). As doctors prescribe inappropriately, including prescribing methadone for pain, and
“pill mills” crop up in states without active prescription drug monitoring programs, addiction
to opiates has soared. To meet the resultant higher demand of opioid addiction, the number
of OTPs nearly doubled between 1996 and 2012, when there were 1270 facilities in the U.S.
(Department of Health and Human Services 2012, 72753). Table 1 provides OTP data for
1996, 2002, and 2011.
Table 1. OTP Statistics 1996, 2002, 2011
1996*
2002**
Number of OTP Clients
151,882
228,140
Number of OTP Facilities
688
1080
Percentage of Private, For Profit OTPs 29%
43%
Percentage of Private, Nonprofit 53%
42%
OTPs
Government (Local, State, Federal, 18%
15%
Tribal)
Median Number of Clients per 177
180
Facility
(**SAMHSA N-SSATS 2003, 2013; *Levine et al. 2004, 15, 24)

2011 **
313,460
1189
54%
36%
10%
200

Further changes may be in store for OTPs. Recent revisions announced by SAMHSA
have relaxed the rules for take-home supplies of buprenorphine, allowing patients to take
home a 30-day supply rather than mandating an “earned” right to take home medications as
is the practice for methadone users, in part because deaths from buprenorphine have been
significantly lower than those from methadone (Department of Health and Human Services
2012, 72753). SAMHSA’s intention is to increase flexibility in the hope of achieving better
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OTP client compliance, but the increased flexibility may also lead to increased diversion
(Department of Health and Human Services 2012, 72758) for illicit purposes.
The Regulatory Environment for OTPs
According to the Institute of Medicine, at least part of complex nature of the OTP
regulatory system stems from a long history of judgmental attitudes reflected in the oftenheard expressions that methadone users are simply “substituting one addiction for another”
and that clinics are “legal drug dealers” (Committee on Federal Regulation of Medicine,
Institute of Medicine 1995). The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) landmark 1995 publication
on federal regulation of methadone treatment was influential in shifting attitudes toward
methadone maintenance treatment:
Methadone-maintained patients show improvement in a number of
outcomes, after an adequate dose (usually 60 -120 mg per day) is
established. Consumption of all illicit drugs, especially heroin, declines.
Crime is reduced, fewer individuals become HIV positive, and individual
function is improved. These outcomes reflect the three objectives of
methadone treatment: assisting the individual addict, enhancing public
safety, and safeguarding the public health. Outcomes serving these
objectives are realized most often by the combined effects of the
medication and the counseling provided by good treatment programs. The
two factors limiting methadone’s effectiveness are the multiple health and
social problems of methadone maintenance patients, and the variability in
quality of treatment programs (1).
The move to accreditation reflected the philosophy expressed in the IOM report and
was implemented as a means of regulation based, in part, on efforts to ensure quality and to
reduce the stigma often associated with drug treatment. SAMHSA’s desire to “position
methadone maintenance treatment more closely within mainstream health care,” thereby
“potentially . . . expand[ing] the availability of treatment within hospitals and health plans of
all kinds – entities that are experienced with meeting accreditation standards” was an unmet
goal, since the majority of non-governmental OTP clinics are stand-alone or chain clinics
devoted to opioid treatment only (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Center for Substance Abuse Treatment 2000). In 2004, three years after the
accreditation process was substituted for the survey process, researchers found that about a
third of states had either reduced or modified survey requirements for accredited OTP
facilities and determined that “quality of communications between states and accrediting
bodies is uneven” (Podus, Prendergast, and Rawson 2004). Complicating the regulatory
environment is that accreditation agencies (unless the state is the accrediting body) do not
make public their findings about OTP violations. In fact, the private accreditors who survey
only periodically may not be aware of even the most egregious violations, since many state
licensing authorities have no responsibility to report to them or vice-versa. One SAMHSA
official admitted, “We have trouble getting information from the accrediting agencies”
(Anonymous, Personal Interview, April 19, 2013).
Some criticisms of OTPs derive from the fact that the majority of clinics in the U.S.
are for-profit entities, where clients must pay for services up-front, often on a daily basis, and
may be turned away for lack of payment. Others decry the disproportionate share of poor
people who use the clinics, but whether this reflects the “last resort” nature of the clinics or
the effect of opioid addiction is unclear. It is clear, however, that deaths from methadone
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overdose – not necessarily related to OTPs ˗ occur disproportionately in poor communities.
A Pulitzer Prize-winning study of methadone in the Seattle Times found that “accidental
methadone overdoses [not those directly related to OTPs] across the Puget Sound area . . .
occur in low-income areas at a rate three times higher than that of high-income areas” (Berens
and Armstrong 2011). Critics allege that for-profit clinics strive to keep overhead low through
limited hours of service, to attract long-term maintenance rather than detox clients, and to
increase the number of take-home doses to reduce office hours for their own economic wellbeing (Freedberg 2013; Anonymous 2010).
While take-home dosing may also encourage compliance with program goals and
client desire to continue in the program, it also provides opportunities for drugs to be illegally
diverted to the black market. A small study of methadone maintenance clients in Canada
found that “seven of the nine MMT [methadone maintenance treatment] patients returned
lower than expected quantities of methadone, while one patient returned more than the
expected quantity” (Varenbut et al. 2007). A 2005 study that compared diversion rates across
Australian states found that “[t]hose states with the most restrictive take-away policies have
the lowest reported prevalence of methadone injection and methadone use in the previous six
months and those states with the most liberal take-away policies have the highest” (Ritter and
Di Natale 2005, 350). Because of the potentially lethal nature of misappropriated methadone,
in order to reduce diversion, SAMHSA advises clinics to require “random call-backs, asking
patients to return to the facility before their scheduled appointments and bring with them the
remainder of their take-home medication” (2009, 6). Since the DEA is required to conduct
only biennial reviews of inventory records, diversion may go unnoticed if the clinic is not
monitoring closely or if the clinic is not required to report missing supplies to the state
regulatory authority.
While prescription methadone is widely viewed as the principal driver of
methadone-related deaths due to the increase in methadone prescriptions for pain (Paulozzi,
Mack, and Jones 2012; SAMHSA 2010a; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012;
Stahl and Webster 2012; United States General Accountability Office 2009), there is no
credible, documented source of unprescribed methadone-related deaths. A 2009 SAMHSA
report states that “it is difficult to obtain enough data to confirm whether methadone deaths
are linked more to OTPs or to pain treatment situations” (SAMHSA 2009, 2).
Deaths of OTP patients are not well documented at the state or federal levels. A
Virginia study using 2004 data (Weimer et al. 2011) and a Vermont study with data from
2001 to 2006 (Madden and Shapiro 2011) both determined that 67 percent of methadone
deaths were due to illicit ˗ not prescribed ˗ methadone, though neither study found high
mortality rates among OTP clients. A 2003 review of methadone deaths in a Minnesota
county from 1992-2002 found that almost 35 percent were opioid therapy clients (Gagajewski
and Apple 2003). A federal effort to document OTP-related deaths was halted in 2009 “due
to concerns about privacy,” forcing SAMHSA “to destroy all records” (Anonymous, Personal
Interview, April 19, 2013). The subject of mortality among OTP patients is complex, since
many patients in methadone treatment have both physical and psychiatric comorbidities, and
deaths of clinic patients may go unreported or not be associated with their treatment. Few
centers track deaths of OTP family members or their associates. The source of diverted
methadone is generally unknown to the medical examiner, and responsibility for tracking
deaths varies widely from state to state.
A GAO report confirms that “circumstances of methadone associated overdose deaths
vary by state,” (2009, 23) the deaths of “patients in OTPs ranging from 4 percent to 50
percent” of total methadone deaths (SAMHSA 2010a, 18). According to a SAMHSA 2010
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mortality report, of the 406 deaths of OTP patients that were voluntarily reported, 27 percent
were in early treatment phases and 32 percent of patients were taking benzodiazepines in
addition to methadone (SAMHSA citing Maxwell 2010a, 20). OTP deaths often occur
“during the first weeks of medically supervised treatment and at the time of dose adjustments”
(SAMHSA 2010a, 5), but diversion of methadone resulting in death, while lower than deaths
from prescription methadone, is also widely reported (Freedberg 2013; National Drug
Intelligence Center 2007; Anonymous 2012a).
According to SAMHSA, risk of death is greatest due to the following factors:
 Simultaneous patient abuse of substances such as
benzodiazepines, other opioids, cocaine, or alcohol; . . .
 interactions between prescribed medications; . . .
 methadone accumulation in the body; . . .
 methadone’s peak respiratory depressant effects; . . .
 poor clinical practice during the start of treatment (induction
dosing phase); . . .
 [lack of] cardiac screening; . . . [and]
 poisoning that occurs when methadone is diverted for nonmedical
use [or ingested by children] (2009, 3-4).
While hundreds of medical studies provide strong evidence that methadone
maintenance is cost-effective, state-by-state and clinic-by-clinic outcomes for policy review
are largely inaccessible because of the large number of overseers, the separation of regulation
and outcomes, and the proprietary nature of the accreditation process. Fears of violation of
patient privacy laws and the lack of a reliable database or dependence on a paper database
limit some state agencies’ ability or willingness to provide even aggregated information on
numbers of clients, length of stay, and other outcomes. When state regulations do not require
collection of such data, the responsibility is left to the accrediting agencies, which do not
release reports to the public. Licensure surveys, which may be publicly reported, are often
infrequent, unavailable, or lack detail. In Georgia, for example, in February 2013, licensure
reports were not available for 23 of 56 opioid treatment programs then operating, since there
are no statutory obligations to survey on a set schedule. As a result, many inspections in
Georgia, as in other states, are driven by complaints, not through the routine regulatory
process. Two Georgia OTPs closed in March and April 2013, and reports were not publicly
available afterwards for either on the state’s facility regulation website. At least one of those
facilities remained on the list of CARF International-accredited programs after closure,
further evidence of a communications disconnect among the regulatory bodies.
Methods
Many scholars have studied the effectiveness of state regulation. Among these
studies are the relationships between state-required training of certified nursing assistants and
improved nursing home resident outcomes (Trinkoff et al. 2013); regulation of tattoo parlors
and public health (Carlson, Lehman, and Armstrong 2012); state licensure of marriage and
family therapists and preparation for practice standards (West and Hinton 2013); regulation
of physical therapy and patient outcomes (Resnik, Feng, and Hart 2006); and “state regulatory
stringency on nursing home quality” (Mukamel et al. 2012). It must be noted, however, that
regulation is only as effective as those agencies charged with oversight, the degree of
authority of agencies charged with oversight, whether violations of policy are linked to
sanctions, and whether regulations are based on or linked to outcomes. While rules may exist,
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this research does not attempt to address the effectiveness or performance of states in
implementation of regulatory policy. The focus is on state regulation of OTPs in the context
of oversight from multiple federal agencies and private accreditation agencies. Two basic
research questions are asked:
 Does state regulation matter? The lack of patient outcomes data at all levels
limits the researchers’ ability to link state regulations directly to patient
outcomes. As a result, this research seeks to determine whether there is a
relationship between the degree of state regulatory authority and the number of
patients, the number of OTPs, and the for-profit or nonprofit status of OTPs
with the following hypotheses:
o H1: Responding states with more stringent regulations have fewer
OTPs.
o H2: Responding states with the fewest regulations have the greatest
number of patients per capita.
o H3: States with higher percentages of for-profit OTPs have more OTP
patients per capita.


Is state regulation mainly about process and less about outcomes? Given that
outcomes data, including sentinel events and death, are not readily available
from federal overseers or accreditation agencies, this research seeks to
determine to what degree states fill that void. A survey tool was employed to
ask whether OTP performance measures and outcomes data are an expectation
of state OTP regulatory authorities with the following hypotheses:
o H4: There is wide variation in regulatory environments across the
states.
o H5: OTP performance measures and outcomes are not widely reported
or publicly available from the states.
o H6: Performance measures emphasize process and outputs, not
outcomes.
o H7: The “regulatory fog” of multi-layered oversight limits the ability
of citizens, potential clients, and the regulators themselves to
determine the safety and effectiveness of OTP programs.

State opioid authorities and state substance abuse agencies were invited to answer questions
about a set list of common state regulations based on federal regulations and a separate review
of regulatory policy in several states. Table 2 summarizes the questions included on the
survey. All questions required Yes/No answers regarding state OTP policies.
Table 2. Survey Questions by Category of Regulation
(Total Measures per Category)
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Drug Testing (15)

Administrative
Regulations (12)
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Clinic must be non-profit
Clinic must be physician-owned
Clinic requires certificate of need
Licensing authority or other state authority must inspect annually
Licensing authority or other state authority must inspect every two years
Minimum number of hours open set by state
Required use of state Prescription Monitoring Program or similar
Requirement to be open 7 days/week
State has performance measures for all OTPs
State inspection results available on website
State inspections unannounced
State must report survey violations/complaint violations to accrediting body
Annual physical for clients
Clients must be discharged after 4 or fewer positive drug screens
Clinic must establish progressive sanctions for clients with positive drug
screens
Clinic must receive OK from central registry prior to first dosing
Clinics must establish specific parameters for acceptance into the OTP
Discharge plan implemented as part of treatment plan
Initial drug tests must be completed and results returned prior to first dosing
Initial orientation and counseling section mandated
Initial physical exam required prior to dosing
Initial plan of care completed within 7 days
OTPs required to have additional screening/counseling during clients' first two
weeks in program
Spot checks for take-home medications required
State rules govern clients driving to and from clinics
Treatment plan on chart within 2 weeks
Treatment plan revised at least quarterly
Required annual or semi-annual reporting to state
Required annual reporting of length of client stay for each client
Required reporting of annual or more frequent inventories
Required reporting of discharges
Required reporting of frequency distribution of clients by dosing level
Required reporting of inventory issues
Required reporting of known diversions
Required reporting of law enforcement calls to clinic
Required reporting of methadone/drug-related client deaths
Required reporting of methadone-related death of client household members
Required reporting of number/percentage of clients with take-home privileges
by category
Required reporting of OTP clients involved in criminal activity
Required reporting of OTP clients involved in diversion
Required reporting of spot-checks for take-homes
Required reporting of state of residence of OPT clients
Required reporting of suspected diversions
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Requirement
s (4)
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Clinic doctor must be at clinic a set percentage of time
Clinic must have RN present during all dosing hours
Minimum education for counselors set
On-site physician must be addiction specialist

In addition, responding state agencies were asked to provide demographic and
outcomes data, including number of OTPs, profit or nonprofit status of OTPs, number of
patients, deaths and other sentinel events, and survey and reporting requirements. A link to
an online survey tool was sent to all State Opioid Treatment Authorities in the United States
in February 2013. Response was inadequate and the same survey was sent as a follow up via
email to all State Substance Abuse Agencies. Twenty-two states with Opioid Treatment
Programs completed the survey portion that included questions concerning regulations.
Fewer responses were received on outcomes and trends, according to respondents due to poor
record keeping, lack of electronic records, lack of historical data collection, and the fact that
many of the responding agencies are not responsible for collecting such information or state
reporting requirements are minimal.
Respondents provided yes or no responses about the existence of specific regulations
in their states. Forty-seven yes/no answers were captured for statistical purposes with
responses converted to ones and zeros in order to quantify the responses as a measure of the
degree of and variation in regulation. Questions to which all answers were no or yes were
omitted, as the intent of the data collection was to differentiate among the states. While the
authors recognize that all regulations should not be weighted equally, all queries about
regulations reflect common practice at the federal level and in many states. The authors also
examined the role of regulation across the respondent states by category of regulation,
including administrative regulations, reporting regulations, staffing regulations, and patient
care and discharge regulations.
Though some outcomes data was available from select states, responses were
inconsistent. The lack of outcomes data limited the ability of the authors to directly compare
regulation with outcomes. Other public data sources include information from SAMHSA, but
a significant lag time in federal reporting must be noted as a limitation. Statistical analysis
includes descriptive statistics and regression analysis to determine the relationship between
regulation, numbers of clinics and patients, and certain outcomes.
Results
Does state regulation matter?
Based on Yes/No responses to 47 questions for which answers varied, there is significant
variation in the degree of regulation and reporting requirements across the states. Table 2
illustrates the total points and statistics for patients and clinics in participating states.
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Table 3. State Data: Total OTPs, OTPs per 100,000 Population (U.S. Census 2010, SAMHSA
2012b).
Total Regulation Points, and Regulation Points by Category
Regulation Points: Mean = 20.09; Median = 21; Mode = 21; St. Dev. = 7.62 Range = 29
Categories of Regulation
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Points for
Administrative
Regulations

Points for Patient
Admission, Care,
Counseling,
Discharge Drug
Testing

Points Assigned for
Reporting
Requirements

Points Assigned for
Staffing
Requirements
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Questions in
Category

--

--

47 Possible

12
Possible

15
Possible

16
Possible

4
Possible

Utah
Oregon
Wisconsin
Washington
Connecticut
Michigan
Georgia
Illinois
Iowa
North Carolina
Louisiana
Minnesota
Kentucky
California
Missouri
Montana
Maine
Virginia
Arkansas
Delaware
South Carolina
Tennessee

12
14
15
21
23
35
56
62
4
47
10
14*
11
146*
11
3
9
23
5
6*
16
12

.43
.37
.26
.31
.64
.35
.58
.48
.13
.49
.22
.26
.25
.39
.18
.30
.68
.29
.17
.67
.35
.19

4
9
14
14
15
16
18
18
17
21
21
21
21
22
22
24
27
27
30
33
33
33

1
1
1
3
3
3
1
0
2
5
3
5
4
4
4
4
3
5
5
8
8
8

1
5
10
6
4
9
10
8
10
8
9
8
8
6
10
10
10
10
13
11
9
11

1
2
2
4
7
0
4
9
4
6
8
5
7
10
7
8
11
9
7
13
11
10

1
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
4
2
4
3

State

H1 incorrectly predicts that states with more stringent regulations will have fewer clinics per
capita. Using data provided by the states or filling in missing data with 2010 OTP “State
Profiles” statistics from SAMHSA (2010b; 2011) for a multiple regression analysis, there is
no statistically significant relationship between total number of regulations or specific areas
of regulation and clinics per capita. In fact, respondent states that require a Certificate of Need
for OTPs, perhaps the most stringent regulatory hurdle for opening an OTP, have slightly
higher OTPs per capita than those that do not require a Certificate of Need, but the t-test for
difference in means is not statistically significant.
Figure 1. OTP Clients and Regulatory Stringency (U.S. Census 2012)
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Fourteen states reported data or partial data on clients in treatment from 2008
through 2012. The percentage of state population in treatment at OTPs in reporting states in
2012 ranged from a high of .4 percent in Connecticut to a low of .05 percent in Wisconsin.
(U.S. Census 2012) H2 incorrectly predicts that states with the fewest regulations will have
the greatest number of patients per capita. H3 is unsubstantiated as there is no correlation
between percentage of for-profit OTPs and OTP patients per capita. As a means of validating
data, patient and facility statistics from SAMHSA’s State Profiles from 2010 were used for
all responding states (SAMHSA 2011). There was no correlation between the stringency of
regulation and the number of patients, the number of clinics, or for-profit/nonprofit status.
Is state regulation mainly about process, not outcomes?
H4 correctly predicts the presence of wide variation in state regulatory environments.
Of 47 regulations, the mean number of regulations per state is 20.9 with a standard deviation
of 7.6. The subset of state-required reporting requirements also indicates a high level of
variation. (See Tables 3 and 4.) It is also unclear whether data collected is accurate or is even
analyzed at the state level, given that some states that indicated on the survey required
reporting of certain data could not produce that same data.
Table 4. State Requirements for Reporting
Mean = 39 Standard Deviation = 22.7
Type of Report

Annual or semi-annual reporting to state
Required annual reporting of length of client stay for each
client
Required reporting of discharges
Required reporting of number/percentage of clients with
take-home privileges by category
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Required reporting of methadone/drug-related client deaths
Required reporting of methadone-related death of client
household members
Required reporting of OTP clients involved in criminal
activity
Required reporting of frequency distribution of clients by
dosing level
Required reporting of suspected diversions
Required reporting of known diversions
Required reporting of spot-checks for take-homes
Required reporting of inventory issues
Required reporting of annual or more frequent inventories

86%
32%
36%
5%
36%
55%
23%
50%
4%

While 19 of 22 states state that they require OTPs to report deaths, fewer than half of
respondents could provide the number of methadone or other drug related deaths of OTP
clients in the past year. There is no way to check reliability of death reports due to privacy
in accreditation agencies, (with the exception of states that serve as the accrediting bodies), a
dearth of publicly reported state data, and the lack of mortality data collection by federal
agencies. Conflicting reports also reduce reliability. One responding Opioid Treatment
Authority reported three deaths at OTPs in 2012, information that was contradicted by the
state licensing agency, which indicated 13 deaths of OTP clients during the same time period.
H5 correctly predicts that OTP performance measures and outcomes are not widely
reported or publicly available from the states. Of the 22 states responding to the survey, only
three report any specific performance measures in place, though some states indicated that
they plan to have performance measures in the future and one state stated that performance
measures are included in state regulations. Of responding states, Connecticut has the most
sophisticated measures of performance with specific targets for performance. North Carolina
maintains demographic and outcomes data in an attractive, useful, and publically accessible
format. Table 5 illustrates measures listed by the three states.
Table 5. Performance Measures Described by Three States
Outputs
Outcomes – Specific levels of performance may
apply
Number of consumers enrolled
Drug and alcohol abstinence
Number of drug screens performed
Clients employed or in school
Reporting requirements met in a Lack of criminal activity
timely manner
Outcomes of drug screens
Contractor meets expected utilization Drug-free babies born
rate
Client satisfaction
Percentage of patients in treatment for Clients maintain level of function
12 month minimum
Clients improve their living situation
Clients maintain or improve social supports
Clients discharged have successfully completed
objectives on plan of treatment
While Kentucky indicated on the survey that they have no performance measures,
they do have access to a thorough evaluation of OTP outcomes created by the University of
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Kentucky. The 2012 report on OTP outcomes demonstrated measurable reductions in alcohol
and substance abuse, increase in income, improvements in education and employment, less
criminal activity and jail time, and increased use of socials supports (Logan et al. 2012).
Maine’s Office of Substance Abuse published an evaluation of medication-assisted therapy
in March 2010, which included recommendations to improve outcomes (McAuley et al.
2010).
States were also asked to describe how they measure success of OTPs. Responses
indicate that states without defined performance measures may provide oversight in other
ways. Arkansas, for example, looks at “employment, number of arrests, and number of
relapses” but does not have a formal performance management program. Other state
responses indicate a disconnect between “success of OTPs” and client outcomes, in most
cases deferring evaluation to others, including the licensure accreditation bodies and even to
the OTPs themselves. One state responded to a survey question about measuring success that
“all clinics are privately owned.” Another says that the “OTPs themselves define if the client
was ‘successful,’” and another commented that individual programs are required to create
their own outcomes measures. Three of the responding states measure OTP success in terms
of compliance with accreditation standards. Others base success on the number of admissions
and discharges, giving credence to H6, which predicts that states collect data that focuses
largely on outputs, not on outcomes.
H6 is further supported in both the lack of performance measures across the states and
the absence of reportable data concerning outcomes. Only two states could provide data on
client time in treatment, although about a third say that they collect such data. While 59
percent of states report that they require reporting of discharges, almost 37 percent could not
explain the reasons for discharge, since discharges may be at the discretion of another agency,
lack of ability to pay, or the OTP’s own rules, including noncompliance and diversion. Only
twelve states require OTPs to report known diversions of methadone, and only five states are
required to report to states the results of spot-checks for take-home medications. Just half of
the responding states require the OTP to report known methadone inventory problems to the
state authority. The absence of data on deaths, as indicated earlier, is a primary missing
outcome. There are investigational studies of data from individual states or clinics that
support the 1995 IOM report that methadone maintenance can improve quality of life for
clients, but there is no updated, comprehensive, reliable source of data about patient outcomes
to support the 1995 study.
H7 predicts that the “regulatory fog” of multi-layered oversight limits the ability of
citizens, potential clients, and the regulators themselves to determine the effectiveness and
safety of OTP programs. Only six of 22 responding states report that licensure surveys are
posted on public websites. Fewer than one-third of responding agencies are required to report
to accrediting bodies, and accrediting bodies are not generally compelled to report to state
and federal agencies. Five states of 22 responding report having closed a facility since 2008,
and four of those closures were in 2012. One such closure was a facility licensed by the state’s
Health Facility Regulation, overseen by the State Opioid Authority, with a current three-year
CARF International accreditation. In early 2013, this clinic was sanctioned by the DEA for
“methadone overages in 2011 and a 2012 shortage of about 460,000 milligrams of
methadone” and fined $12,500 (United States Attorneys Office 2013). In another case
reported on a state public website, a facility received a remediable deficiency but without
substantive sanctions for giving free doses of methadone to current clients who successfully
recruited new “customers.” Minnesota’s Lake Superior Treatment Center was given “high
marks, finding that the clinic met or exceeded standards” and reaccredited for three years by
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CARF International just before the state authority found 56 violations and closed the clinic
(Anonymous 2012b). In some states, OTP owners or managers serve as part-time surveyors
for accreditation agencies, which raises the specter of conflict of interest when the surveyors’
own facilities may be surveyed by members of their own associations.
The survey also indicates that there are also missed opportunities for improved care.
Only half of the states participate in prescription drug monitoring programs. Only 55 percent
of states require OTPs to have initial drug screens on the charts prior to the first dosing, a best
practice, and only four require approval from the state’s central registry before initiation of
treatment. The first two weeks of treatment are especially high-risk and coordinating care
with other health care providers and the state could improve safety.
Discussion and Conclusions
A review of literature that describes the benefits of opioid replacement therapy
supports a place for Opioid Treatment Programs within the health care system. Instead, many
OTPs are managed by laypersons with little professional medical oversight in for-profit, nonmedical facilities with limited hours of service, often five hours or fewer on weekdays and
two hours or less on weekends. Only six of 22 responding states require clinics to be open
seven days a week, and only two set minimum hours for clinics. Six states require defined
hours for physicians to be on-site, and only nine of 22 require the presence of a registered
nurse during dosing hours. Fewer than half of the states responding require a minimum
amount of time in patient counseling. Many OTPs operate with a “dose and go” philosophy
and little mandated counseling, despite the fact that counseling as part of detoxification is
considered a best practice (Veilleux et al 2010; Kraft et al. 1997). Although there are newer
and more effective substitutes that could help more patients work toward detoxification and
simultaneously reduce their risk of harm, nearly all clients in the U.S. are considered longterm methadone maintenance clients (SAMHSA 2012b). This fact warrants a new look at
expectations and outcomes.
The failure of the health system to incorporate and advance opioid treatment may
reflect societal attitudes that demonstrate little empathy for those addicted to opiates, despite
the fact that these drugs are increasingly initially attained by legitimate prescription rather
than heroin, which was the primary substance for which methadone clinics were founded.
Poverty may also be a factor, that is, there are few to speak for the economically marginalized
outside of the OTPs who serve them. The decline in government-operated facilities from 18
percent in 1996 to ten percent in 2011 and the subsequent growth in for-profit clinics and
clients per clinic are further indications of a shift in policy that may not portend a focus on
best practices (SAMHSA N-SSAT 2003; SAMHSA N-SSATS 2012b). OTP businesses are
considered “one of the most lucrative sectors in health care because of its cash-only nature
and high profit margin” (Swisher 2013). The focus on profits – not patients – and continued
demedicalization of OTP services have potential to further ostracize OTPs from mainstream
health care.
The deliberate decision of federal agencies to shift direct oversight of OTPs to
accreditation agencies and, by default, to state licensure bodies or substance abuse authorities
has resulted in a focus on regulations and process to the detriment of performance measures
and outcomes. Though this shift to accreditation initially reflected the federal government’s
intent to improve quality and mainstream methadone maintenance, the effective abdication
of governmental authority has reduced transparency, allowing even the worst clinics to obtain
the accreditation “seal of approval.” This hand-off of authority also raises concerns due to
the fact that the increasingly for-profit OTP providers are operating in a customer-vendor
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relationship with the private accreditation agencies, which are not forthcoming with
information about outcomes, even to federal regulators (Anonymous, Personal Interview,
April 20, 2013) and which sometimes hire other OTP managers as surveyors. The ability of
clients to compare clinics for quality is virtually impossible due to the proprietary nature of
the private accrediting bodies and the lack of publically available outcomes data from state
or local governments.
In fairness to government regulators, the addition of 200 new methadone clinics and
nearly 100,000 clients in the United States in the past decade (Swisher 2013) has increased
demand, perhaps diluting the strength of oversight. The absence of performance data obvious
in this survey may also be associated with declining state revenues that have caused
regulatory bodies to ration their services or to further punt responsibility to other agencies
like the accrediting bodies. In effect, the government overseer has become little more than a
middleman serving in a pass-through role. A more coordinated approach to regulation,
enhanced mandatory reporting with verification, a uniform system of sanctions, or even a
wholesale reconsideration of the current system of regulatory authority could improve
outcomes and make the system more transparent. The number of deaths and the growth in
long-term methadone maintenance are a call to revisit the regulators’ dependence on
accreditation as the solution.
The effort to quantify regulations for comparison purposes obscures the importance
of certain regulations, including those for patient protection, and while this is a study
limitation, the methodology does provide a means of comparison across the states. The study
is also limited by the fact that data are self-reported with a near total absence of meaningful
outcomes to compare with regulatory stringency. The data derived from the participating
states in this study indicate wide variation in regulatory policy and management and, by
extension, OTP performance and client outcomes. The “regulatory fog” of multi-layered
oversight and the focus on rule and process as the end, not the means, obfuscates the vital
information required for evaluation by methadone clinic clients, the general public, the OTPs,
and even the regulators themselves.
Many professional journal articles proclaim the harm-reduction benefits of
methadone maintenance, but few explore a world without methadone maintenance clinics as
they are currently known. Further study of OTP client outcomes by non-clinic researchers
across the country could provide valuable insights into the work of these facilities and allow
health scientists to determine if the “regulatory fog” that current policy represents is, in fact,
“counterfactual” (Warren and Wilkening 2012, 840). At a time when opioid addiction is
growing, a fresh look at alternatives could ultimately provide opportunities to identify best
practices that could return medication-assisted treatment to the health care fold and improve
outcomes for persons addicted to opioids.
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